INTRODUCTION

Between 15 and 22 February 2001, a Pax Christi International delegation[1], visited Israel, the Occupied Palestinian Territories and the areas under Palestinian self-rule. The main aim of the visit was to assess the situation in light of the al-Aqsa Intifadah that was triggered by the visit of Ariel Sharon to the Haram al-Sharif or Temple Mount on 28 September 2000. An additional aim was to see in what way the peace process is influenced by the change in administration in the United States and the election of Ariel Sharon as Prime Minister of Israel.

The delegation found a region immersed in crisis with a total breakdown of contact between Israel and the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). In addition, a situation of public distrust existed between the leadership on both sides. What has been built up over the years since the Oslo peace accord in terms the building of joint projects and institution, has been dismantled almost totally in the past 6 months. Palestinian ministries can hardly function due to the lack of money and Israel co-operation. The Palestinian Ministry of Interior, for example, cannot issue any ID’s without Israel’s approval, and contact between the Palestinian and Israeli authorities has been severed. Infrastructure that was built up during the Oslo process has been destroyed.

The crisis that is dominating the region is mainly concentrated in three areas:

·        Economic: The Palestinian economy has been engulfed in a crisis that will take it years to recover from. Although the Palestinian economy had been pushing ahead slowly over a few years, today the unemployment rate is higher than ever before. The PNA is unable to pay its civil servants and more people than ever before are living below the poverty line.

·        Security: The use of violence has reached a peak on both sides. The Israeli security forces use disproportionate force in reaction to Palestinian resistance. Since 29 September 2000, more than 380 Palestinians have been killed by Israeli security forces and settlers and almost 12,000 have been injured.[2] In the same period, more than 60 Israelis have been killed by Palestinians. More than half of them were civilians.[3] Palestinian security personnel have been involved in these attacks on Israeli soldiers and civilians.

·        Legal: Both the Israeli government and the PNA have used the crisis as a pretext for non-compliance with human rights standards. In the PNA-ruled areas, a situation of lawlessness has taken over. On the level of international law, the conflict has brought about large-scale violations of international humanitarian law and human rights.

In past reports, Pax Christi emphasised that respect for international law is a precondition for a just and durable peace. One of the reasons why the Oslo process failed was because it neglected international law and instead represented the unequal balance of power between Israel and the Palestinians. The Intifadah broke out because the Palestinian people were frustrated with the Oslo process and that frustration reached a peak after the failure of the Camp David talks in the summer of 2000. After seven years, solutions to the most critical issues – Jerusalem, the refugees, distribution of water, the settlements- were still as far away as in the past. While Ehud Barak was talking peace and making promises, he created more facts (?) on the ground than his predecessor, Benyamin Netanyahu.

In the summer of 2000, Pax Christi published a report in which it called for a stronger role of the European Union (EU) in the Middle East Peace Process.[4] During the crisis of the past months, the EU has remained silent and continued to hide itself behind the United States. However, the new administration in the United States is expected to involve itself less in the negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians than the Clinton administration had. Moreover, with the bombing of Baghdad the Bush administration has lost its credibility in the Arab world already. The bombing took place during this delegation’s visit to the region. Therefore, this offers a new chance and an obligation for the EU, which is the largest donor to the Palestinian territories and the main trade partner of Israel, to take on its responsibility in the Middle East peace process.

The Camp David myth

Many people were made to believe that at the Camp David summit of July 2000, peace between Israel and the Palestinians was within reach. One of the problems of the Oslo process was that it left the most difficult issues for the end. A summit aimed at reaching an agreement over all the final status issues was premature at the time of Camp David, the positions of the negotiating parties being still too disparate. What Camp David really revealed was how large the distance was between Israeli and Palestinian public opinion. Both Ehud Barak and Yasser Arafat could not proceed any further if they were not to lose the support of their respective populations. Israeli public opinion in general denies the rights that international law upheld for the Palestinians. On the other hand,  Palestinian public opinion demands that international law be implemented. In the end, Palestinian President Arafat was blamed both by Bill Clinton and by Ehud Barak, for the failure of the summit. It is a myth, however, that Camp David collapsed over the issue of Jerusalem; other final status issues such as the Palestinian refugees and the settlements would also have turned out to be just as unsolvable at that time. The world saw Ehud Barak as a peace dove, but what the Palestinians saw was the reality on the ground: the expansion of settlements, land expropriation and house demolitions. However, the message Ehud Barak came back with was that the Palestinians are untrustworthy peace partners. The opposite was true for the Palestinians regarding Ehud Barak.

ECONOMIC SITUATION

The current situation in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is dominated by a severe economic crisis. According to PECDAR, the Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction, the present economic situation in the areas ruled by the PNA is the worst since 1967. According to the United Nations Special Co-ordinator (UNSCO), the unemployment rate in the West Bank and Gaza Strip has risen from about 11% to about 38% of the labour force during the current crisis.[5] The percentage of the population living below the poverty line is estimated to have risen from 21.1% in September 2000 to 31.8% at the end of 2000.[6] The main reason for the economic crisis in the Palestinian Territory is the closure that Israel has imposed. Some other factors affecting the economy negatively are material damage caused by the violence, the decline in tourism, the uprooting of trees, and the negative investment climate.

Although the economic crisis has mainly hit the Palestinian economy, the Israeli economy has also felt the impact of the conflict. Israel is also experiencing a serious decrease in tourism, and because of the lack of Palestinian workers, the construction sector is stifled.

Closure

Since the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifadah, Israel established an economic siege on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, which indiscriminately affects the whole Palestinian population. Israel has imposed an external closure as well as an internal closure on the Palestinian territories. The external closure denies Palestinians from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip access to Israel. The international borders with Jordan and Egypt and the Palestinian airport in the Gaza Strip have also been closed, as well as the safe passage between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The internal closure separates Palestinian towns and villages from each other. The Israeli Defence Force (IDF) has bulldozed roads, dug ditches around towns and blocked roads with rubble and concrete blocks. According to the Israeli human rights organisation B’Tselem, internal closures have been imposed selectively as a collective punishment for violent actions committed by one or more of the community’s residents.[7] On 2 January 2001, the Gaza Strip was divided into three parts: Gaza City and the refugee camps in the North, the refugee camps in the middle and Khan Younis and Rafah in the South.[8] Persons who want to go from one part to the other have to go by sea. In addition to these closures, curfews were also imposed on a number of Palestinian towns and villages, such as Huwara in the Nablus district and Hebron.[9]

The damage that has been caused by the Intifadah does not only have a short-term effect, but will also have a tremendous impact on the middle and long term. According to Terje Roed Larsen, the United Nations Special Co-ordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, the Palestinians are, under the current closure, losing 6.8 million US$ a day, which comes up to a total of more than a billion US$ till now. As a result of the closure, an estimated 125,000 Palestinian workers have not been able to reach their jobs in Israel.[10] These workers are mostly inhabitants of the refugee camps.

The Israeli-imposed closure has also stifled import to and export from the Palestinian territories. The Palestinian economy is highly dependent on foreign trade, especially with Israel. Because of the lack of natural resources, the Palestinian areas depend on the import of raw materials from Israel for their industries. With the blockade of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the Palestinian industry and construction sectors could not continue working. Because Israel controls the international borders, all import to the Palestinian territories has to be authorised by Israel. During the past months, cargo destined for the West Bank and Gaza Strip has been kept at the harbours of Ashdod and Haifa by the Israeli authorities. Even cargo for the United Nations Relief and Work Agency for the Palestine Refugees (UNWRA) has been blocked at Ashdod. In addition to the damage caused by the delay in the delivery of goods, importers have to pay thousands of US$ a day to store goods at the harbour. Agriculture, which contributes to over a third of the Palestinian GPD[11], has also been affected by the internal and external closure of the Palestinian areas. Farmers were not able to transport their products to the market. On several occasions, Palestinian farmers working on their land have been attacked by settlers. Olives are an important Palestinian agricultural product. The outbreak of the Intifadah in the season of the olive harvest, has resulted in the farmers not being able to reach their lands to harvest the olives and transport them to the markets. Also, there is not enough fuel for the oil presses.

One of the main sources of income of the PNA is the import tax.  After the violence broke out, imports have seriously declined due to lowered demand and restrictions on movement. In addition, Israel has withheld tax income that it should transfer to the PNA according to the Paris Protocol of 1994. According to Palestinian officials, Israel has kept hundreds of thousands of US$ from the PNA. According to UNSCO, the tax income of the PNA during the crisis has been, on an average, 45 million US$ a month, only half of the average monthly tax income during the first 9 months of 2000.[12]

Material damage

The military attacks on Palestinian locations have also contributed to the decline of productivity in the Palestinian areas. Shelling from tanks and helicopters has caused damage to workshops and infrastructure. Moreover, the Israeli army has uprooted crops on large areas of agricultural land and demolished many Palestinian houses for ‘security’ purposes. According to the Palestinian Ministry of Agriculture, about 25,000 olive trees and fruit trees have been uprooted in the West Bank and Gaza Strip since October 2000. When these olive trees are replaced, it takes about 7 years before they bear fruit again. That means that these uprootings, executed under the pretext of security, but often as a means of collective punishment, have a severe effect on the mid-term. The Israeli army has bulldozed an estimated 11,000 dunums[13] of land.[14] Since 29 September 2000, almost 12,000 Palestinians have been injured as a result of the confrontations.[15] This means that many people have not been able to work temporarily and an estimated 1,500 have become permanently disabled.[16]

Tourism and investment

Tourism is an important source of income both for Israel and the PNA. Since the outbreak of the Intifadah, tourism to the region has almost stopped. In the past few years, the PNA had been promoting tourism to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In connection with the millennium, large investments were made in the Palestinian tourism industry, especially in Bethlehem. Hotels were built and infrastructure was improved. But today Bethlehem is deserted.

The insecure political situation has made investment in the Palestinian areas increasingly unattractive. Foreign investment in the Palestinian territories is necessary, especially in order to promote small and medium sized private enterprises. One of the priorities of EU aid to the Palestinian territories is the development of the private sector, which can create employment and reduce the dependence on the Israeli economy.[17] However, according to the World Bank, the business environment in the West Bank and Gaza Strip suffers from confusing commercial legislation and a lack of public sector regulatory institutions.[18] The World Bank states that the stagnation of private investment is largely due to the lack of accountable, transparent and effective public institutions.[19] In other words, private investment from outside is needed and must be facilitated, but this has to be accompanied by the development of public institutions and infrastructure.

SECURITY

Escalating violence

The violence used in the conflict today is unprecedented. The Israeli army responds with excessive use of force to Palestinian violence and uses tanks and helicopters to shell Palestinian residential areas. On the Palestinian side only small arms are used, but on this side the use of weapons is more than ever and Palestinian gunmen have attacked Israeli residential areas and unarmed civilians. In addition, Islamic organisations commit bomb attacks that are often directed against innocent civilians. The region has been caught in a hopeless spiral of violence that many people fear will not lead anywhere. Although violence is used by both parties, this violence is not symmetrical. International organisations and human rights organisations have stated that Israel is using a disproportionate amount of force in response to Palestinian acts of violence.[20] The violence has led to a dangerous polarisation between the two populations, and on both sides violence against ‘enemies’ on their own side has become widely accepted.

The extra-judicial executions carried out by Israel (see the section below) have contributed to an aggravating spiral of violence. In revenge for the liquidation of Dr. Thabet Thabet, his cousin and a number of others by the Israeli security forces members of Fateh killed two Israelis on 23 January 2001. A number of Palestinians suspected of collaborating with Israel have also allegedly been killed by Palestinian individuals and armed groups.[21]

Israel argues that the uprising has been orchestrated by the PNA, and even Palestinian Communications Minister Emad Faluji has confirmed that. Most people familiar with the region, however, knew that frustration amongst the Palestinian population over the Oslo process was growing over a period of time and that the situation was going to explode at some point. The al-Aqsa Intifadah started on the streets, and in the beginning there was no strategy and nobody knew what the uprising would lead to. Faluji’s remark can be put into the context of a Palestinian leadership without control, without a strategy, trying to create the image of being in full control and trying to restore confidence.

Settlers’ militias

In the occupied Palestinian territories, well-trained, heavily armed settlers’ militias have been established. Over many years, human rights organisations have reported acts of violence perpetrated by Jewish settlers against Palestinian civilians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.[22] If punished at all, these settlers receive relatively light punishments for their crimes, especially in comparison with the punishment of Palestinians who commit crimes against Jews. These armed militias, that block roads and attack Palestinians, are given freedom of action by the IDF. Ever since the beginning of the Intifadah the activities of these settlers groups have increased. Since October 2000, settlers have killed at least 7 Palestinians.[23] In addition to the 7 cases of Palestinians killed by settlers, 4 bodies of Palestinians were found near settlements in unclear circumstances. At least 39 Palestinians have been shot and injured by settlers and at least 11 have been beaten by settlers during the past six months. There have been at least 48 reports of stoning attacks and another 48 attacks against property, especially the uprooting of olive trees by settlers. In some cases settlers attacked Palestinians while the IDF (Israeli Defence Force) stood idly by.[24]

Reports of human rights organisations such as B’Tselem[25] and PHRMG[26] have clarified that cases of settlers’ violence are rarely investigated seriously and that settlers are rarely punished for their acts. In this light, the case of Nahum Korman should be mentioned. On 21 January 2001, the Jerusalem District Court sentenced this settler, who killed the 12-year old Palestinian boy Hilmi Shusha, to six months community service and paying NIS 70,000 (about US$17,500) compensation. On the same day, an Israeli court sentenced the 17-year old Palestinian girl Su’ad Ghazal from Sabastia  to six and a half years imprisonment for trying to stab a Jewish settler. Because of the aggressive reputation of Israeli settlers and the illegality of the settlements under international law, the Palestinian leadership has given the Palestinians the green light to attack settlers travelling in the occupied territories. As a result, a number of unarmed Israelis have been killed by Palestinian gunmen.

Religious incitement

During this crisis, the threat of Islamic movements, such as Hamas, has increased. The PNA has not been able to react adequately to the emergency situation. But Islamic organisations have been providing services to the population that the PNA has not been able to provide. Therefore, it takes the Islamic organisations no efforts to recruit new activists. As soon as Sharon was elected Prime Minister, Hamas announced that 10 bomb attacks would be carried out in the coming period.

During the visit of the Pax Christi delegation, officials of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs accused religious leaders of inciting their followers to using violence. On the other hand, religious leaders accuse political leaders of bringing religion into the conflict, which is, in their eyes, a political conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. Christian, Muslim and Jewish religious leaders say that the political process should be left to the politicians, but religious leaders can play a role by advocating a reconciliatory attitude and inter-religious dialogue. The religious communities can especially offer a grass-root contribution through peace education.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Excessive use of force by the Israeli security forces

Since the Al-Aqsa Intifadah broke out, Israel has used excessive force in reaction to Palestinian violent demonstrations. The United Nations Security Council condemned “the excessive use of force against Palestinians, resulting in injury and loss of human life” in its resolution 1322 of 7 October 2000. The United States, who often veto resolutions that are too critical of Israel, abstained from voting. The excessive use of lethal force has led to many deaths, which Amnesty International describes as ‘wilful killings’.[27] According to international regulations, law enforcement officials may resort to lethal use of firearms only when strictly unavoidable in order to protect life.[28] Amnesty International concluded that the Israeli security forces use military methods rather than policing methods in the control of demonstrations. The Palestinian Red Crescent Society observed a sharp increase in the use of live ammunition and a sharp decrease in the use of rubber coated metal bullets during the first four months of the Intifadah.[29] It is estimated that 78% of the deaths on the Palestinian side were caused by live ammunition and 10.9% by shelling.[30] A significant percentage of the injuries were located in the upper part of the body: 41.7% in the head and neck and 31.8% in the chest.[31] Ambulances and medical personnel have also been targeted by the Israeli security forces. As of the beginning of March 2001, 1 ambulance driver had been killed, almost a hundred medical personnel had been injured and 56 ambulances of the Palestinian Red Crescent Society have been hit by live ammunition, bullets and stones.[32]

Arrest campaigns

In connection with the clashes of the past months, Israel has arrested hundreds of  persons, many of them under 18 years, during arrest campaigns in East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza Strip and in Israel. Hundreds are still in detention. In some cases, the detainees were denied access to lawyers for up to a week, and in many cases the courts have refused bail to detainees.[33] Many Palestinians were reportedly beaten during their arrest, during transportation to police stations and in detention. Reportedly, youth under the age of 18 were also beaten up by Israeli police officers.[34] 

Torture/illegal interrogation methods

In September 1999, the Israeli High Court of Justice ruled out different forms of physical pressure during interrogations, such as shabeh – an interrogation method during which the interrogated is tied to a low chair with unequal legs, with the wrists bound behind the back and a stinking sack on the head and violently shaken. Until the High Court decision, these forms of torture, as well as sleep deprivation and loud noise, had been widely used by the Israeli General Security Service. The High Court decision was a step forward, although it did not rule out future legislation legalising physical pressure (a law has been drafted by the Knesset allowing ‘moderate forms of physical pressure’). Since the High Court decision, one obvious violation of this decision has been reported by the Public Committee Against Torture in Israel (PCATI). According to PCATI, 36-year old Nassar Iyad, who was arrested near Netzarim on 29 January 2001, was forced to sit on a chair, bent over until his head touched the floor, for a prolonged period of time.[35]

Extra-judicial executions

During the al-Aqsa Intifadah, Israel has adopted a policy of deliberately killing Palestinians suspected of carrying out or planning to carry out violent attacks on Israeli targets. As of February 2001, at least 10, and perhaps as many as 30, extra-judicial executions have been carried out by the Israeli security forces against Palestinians.[36] Whereas most governments deny carrying out extra-judicial executions, the Israeli government is of the opinion that it is a legal policy. Israeli officials, such as Efraim Sneh, the Deputy Defense Minister under Prime Minister Barak, have openly defended the policy of extra-judicial executions. According to Amnesty International, some of the executions were carried out in cases where it would have been possible to arrest the suspect.[37] Some of the Palestinians have been killed by sniper fire, but in other cases Palestinians were bombed from Israeli helicopters. Because of those methods, a number of uninvolved Palestinians were killed alongside the persons targeted. For example, when Hussein ‘Abayat was killed in Bethlehem on 9 November 2000, two women in their fifties who were in the same place were killed too and nine other persons were injured. According to Amnesty International, it is not clear who authorises the killings.[38] In order to be able to carry out these extra-judicial executions, Israel relies on a wide network of Palestinian informants.

Restrictions on the freedom of movement; violations of economic, social and cultural rights

Since 1993, a general closure had been imposed on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, meaning that any Palestinian from the West Bank or Gaza Strip who wanted to travel to Jerusalem, through the so-called “safe passage” between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip or abroad, needed a permit from the Israeli authorities. At certain times, during Jewish holidays or after Palestinian bomb attacks, Israelis strengthened this general closure to a comprehensive closure, when no travel permits were issued and earlier permits were revoked. Since 8 October 2000, a comprehensive closure has been imposed on the West Bank and Gaza. In addition to that, the Israeli authorities have imposed temporary sieges on different Palestinian towns and villages. In some places curfews have also been imposed. In the H2 area in Hebron, in which some 400 settlers live, the Palestinian population has been put under curfew, as well as in Huwara village south of Nablus. These closures and curfews have brought about the violation of economic, social and cultural rights of the Palestinian population. The right to work is provided in Article 6 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which was ratified by Israel in 1991. The closure denied Palestinians their right to work directly (people cannot reach their jobs) and indirectly (supplies necessary for production do not arrive). Another right stipulated by the ICESCR (Article 12) is the right to health. The closures have caused the violation of the right to medical treatment of many Palestinians. Ambulances have been blocked at Israeli army checkpoints and attacked by Israeli security personnel and settlers. The Palestinian Red Crescent Society recorded 120 attacks on 56 of its ambulances between 29 September 2000 and 9 March 2001.[39] A number of Palestinians died because they could not reach the hospital in time. On 14 March 2001, for example, 48-year old Amira Abu Seif, from Faqu’a in the Jenin area died after being held for 3 and a half hours at a checkpoint when her family tried to get her to a hospital in Jenin because she was suffering from an upsurge in her blood sugar level.[40] In another incident, a woman was forced to give birth at a checkpoint because the soldiers would not let her pass to go to hospital.

The closure has also caused the violation of the right of education, which is also provided by ICESCR (Article13). Many teachers cannot reach their schools. In areas under curfew, all classes are cancelled. The IDF also closed a number of schools in Hebron and al-Khader village because of their strategic location. On 15 November 2000, the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI) petitioned the Israeli High Court of Justice to order the opening of these schools, but the High Court refuted the petition.

Although the Israeli authorities argue that the closure and curfews are necessary because of security reasons, organisations such as the Israeli human rights organisation B’Tselem, have argued that the closure is a form of collective punishment, for two reasons: First, closure has a severe effect on the whole population rather than on individuals who constitute a security threat. Second, closure is often imposed in reaction to violent acts committed by Palestinians against Israelis and eased as a ‘gesture’ in a political context, rather than when the security situation changes.[41]     

The rule of law in the PNA areas

The position of the PNA has seriously weakened during the past months. On the one hand there is the economic crisis which makes it very hard for the PNA to consolidate its rule. On the other hand, a political polarisation has developed, with not only the ‘usual’ Hamas and Islamic Jihad opposition against the PNA, but also Fateh groups, belonging to the party of Yasser Arafat, which are operating more and more independently. The crisis has led to a (further) crack down of the rule of law in the PNA areas. Palestinians warn against an increase in criminal cases because Palestinian security forces are not willing to enforce the law anymore. On the other hand, Palestinian security officers have reportedly been kept out of refugee camps in the West Bank. Leaders of Amaari camp near Ramallah and Balata camp near Nablus have denied Palestinian security officers access to these camps.[42]

Collaborators

A particularly sensitive issue the PNA has to deal with is the issue of Palestinians collaborating with Israel. Israel relies on Palestinian informants for its extra-judicial executions of Palestinians. The public pressure to kill collaborators is very strong in the Palestinian territories. On 13 January 2001, the PNA succumbed to public pressure and after mock trials in State Security Courts, two Palestinians were publicly executed by the PNA. In Nablus, Allan Bani Odeh was sentenced to death for playing a role in the killing of Ibrahim Bani Odeh on 23 November 2000. The execution took place in front of 5,000 people. In Gaza, Majdi Mikkawi was executed after he was found guilty of giving Israel information that led to the killing of four Fateh members, amongst whom was his uncle. These were the first public executions in the PNA areas. In February 2000, a man from Nablus who allegedly raped a 5-year old girl, was tried in a State Security Court and sentenced to life imprisonment with hard labour, after a large group of protestors had called for his death penalty.[43] In several cases, civilians have been tried in these State Security Courts, which have been criticised for their non-compliance with international fair trial safeguards. Persons tried in a State Security Court are often not appointed a defence lawyer and do not have the right to appeal. It is clear, however, that ‘even’ collaborators must be punished according to international fair trial standards.  

Freedom of expression

One of the rights that is very often violated in the areas under PNA authority is the right to freedom of press and freedom of expression. The most recent example is the closure in March 2001 of the office of al-Jazira, a Qatari television channel, in Ramallah, after the channel had shown images critical of Yasser Arafat. During the year 2000, private Palestinian radio and television stations have repeatedly been closed by the authorities, and journalists have been arrested. Journalist Maher al-Alami for example was arrested on 6 June 2000, after he criticised the closing of television and radio stations on a local television station.[44] Palestinian intellectuals and politicians have also been arrested after having criticised the PNA. Mu’awiyah al-Masri, member of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), was shot in the leg in Nablus after he signed the ‘Petition of Twenty’, a pamphlet that was signed by 20 Palestinian intellectuals, including nine members of the PLC. The petition criticised the corruption in the PNA. Abd as-Sattar Qasem, a teacher at Najah University in Nablus and at Bir Zeit University was arrested and was kept in detention until January. In February he was arrested again and he was kept in detention without charge or trial until the end of July 2000.[45]

Arbitrary detentions

The Palestinian security forces have repeatedly carried out arrest campaigns of persons suspected of affiliation with opposition groups. Members of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, as well as members of left wing factions such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), have been arrested during such arrest campaigns. Another example of these arbitrary arrests is what happened after the French Prime Minister Jospin was stoned during a visit to Bir Zeit University on 26 February 2000. In the wake of that incident, the Palestinian security service arrested many students belonging to opposition parties such as Hamas and PFLP, although many of them had not been involved in the incident at Bir Zeit University. There are strong indications that the Palestinian authorities used the incident as a pretext to arrest students who were politically active in opposition parties.[46]

Torture and maltreatment of detainees

There are regular reports about torture and maltreatment of detainees under the PNA. Palestinians have died under suspicious circumstances in PNA detention. In the most recent case, 30-year old Salem al-Akra’a died after he was transferred from the Military Intelligence Service prison in Nablus to al-Watani hospital in the same city on 27 February 2001. The Palestinian human rights organisation LAW stated that there were indications that al-Akra’a died as a result of Shabeh – the tying of the person to a small chair, a method regularly used by the Israeli General Security Service in the past – and beating. Ironically, the methods of the Israeli General Security Service have been adopted by the Palestinian security services. A considerable part of the Palestinian interrogators have been in Israeli detention in the past.[47]

The right of return of the Palestinian refugees

“Do you want us to recognise the right of return? Do you want Israel to commit suicide?” (Naomi Chazan,  Deputy Speaker of the Knesset)

Today, the Palestinians who fled during the war of 1948 and their descendants have grown to a refugee population of about 5 million.[48] The refugees constitute over two thirds of the total Palestinian population. About one and a half million Palestinians live in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Large numbers of Palestinian refugees live in Jordan (1.8 million), Syria (460,000) and Lebanon (422,000), as well as other Arabic and western countries. Therefore, a solution for the refugee problem is necessary in order to achieve stability in the whole region. The refugees living in the camps in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip – over half of the refugee population in the Gaza Strip and about a quarter of the refugees in the West Bank – live in substandard circumstances: overcrowding, poor health services, poor water networks. Ironically, the refugees registered with UNRWA are sometimes better off than other Palestinians who became victims of the al-Aqsa Intifadah, because UNRWA has been able to provide emergency relief to them. Its mandate, however, does not allow assistance to people not registered with UNRWA. 

Since the Camp David meeting of July 2000, the refugee issue is ‘back on the agenda’. There, the Palestinian negotiating team demanded that Israel recognises the right of return and compensation of the Palestinian refugees, which is stipulated by international law.[49] Israel refuses to accept the right to return of millions of refugees to Israel, because ‘that will change the Jewish character of the state’. However, how many refugees in the end will exercise their right of return, will depend on various factors, such as the compensation offered and the possibility to obtain citizenship in the country of residence or in a third country. Human rights organisations such as Badil and B’Tselem reject the idea of setting quota to the Palestinians who want to return, because that is contradictory to the legal principles of the individual right to return.[50] In this case, the number of Palestinians who will choose to return to Israel is largely in the hands of the  international community, which can contribute by providing generous funds for compensation and by offering the refugees the possibility to obtain citizenship in other countries. In this respect, countries such as Syria and Lebanon, which house large numbers of refugees but refuse to grant them citizenship, should be willing to adopt Palestinian refugees as citizens. 

Settlements

During the al-Aqsa Intifadah, Israel has continued its policy of creating ‘facts on the ground’ in terms of settlement expansion and land expropriations. Under the government of Ehud Barak, settlement construction reached a peak: In 2000, 1,943 housing units were constructed in settlements in the occupied territories, the highest number since 1992.[51] Today, about 200,000 Israelis live in settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories, excluding Jerusalem. Even during the Intifadah construction work continued: In the last quarter of 2000, work was begun on 954 housing units, compared to 368 in the last quarter of 1999.[52] The election of Ariel Sharon as Prime Minister of Israel probably implies that settlement activities will continue on a large scale during his government. The Pax Christi delegation witnessed some examples of settlement activities around Jerusalem: During the past months, construction of a road connecting the settlements of Pisgat Ze’ev and Neve Yaakov on the Eastern side of Jerusalem with the Jerusalem-Tel Aviv Highway has continued and new buildings have arisen in the Maaleh Hazeitim settlement in the Palestinian neighbourhood of Ras al-Amud in East Jerusalem.

In March 2001, the rejection by the Jerusalem municipal council of an appeal brought closer the construction of a new Jewish settlement in Abu Dis, a Palestinian village on the Eastern side of Jerusalem.[53] This settlement will cut off the only corridor that connects the West Bank with the Old City of Jerusalem and will complete the ring of settlements that severs East Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank. Meanwhile, the Jerusalem Municipality’s Planning and Construction Committee is going to decide on the expansion of the Har Homa settlement south of Jerusalem with another 2,830 housing units.[54] This settlement caused international uproar during the Netanyahu government, who then decided to postpone construction on the site. When Barak came to power, construction of the settlement started and 2,000 housing units have already been put up to sale.[55] The continuing expansion of settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are a violation of international humanitarian law, specifically article 47 of the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilians in Time of War, which prohibits the occupying power to transfer (parts of) its population into the occupied territory. The expansion of settlements and of the network of by-pass roads frustrating a future solution of the final status issues an are against the letter and spirit of the agreements of the Oslo process.

Israel exporting products from the settlements

It is generally assumed that Israel is deliberately exporting products made in settlements in the occupied territories under EU preferences provided by the Association Agreement between the EU and Israel. In 2000, the Interim Association Agreement  was changed into a final one. According to Article 83 of the Association Agreement, the agreement is only applicable to the territory of the State of Israel. This does not include the occupied territories, including the Golan heights, which Israel annexed unilaterally contrary to international law. Since 1997, Ngo’s have come up with indications that Israel is exporting products from the settlements under EU preferences. The European Commission has been presented with these violations of the Association Agreement, but asked for further inquiry in order to collect evidence. During the year 2000, customs services of a number of EU member states have requested verification from Israel concerning products of which there are ‘reasonable doubts’ about their origin. About 5,000 such requests have been presented to Israel in connection with flowers, tomatoes, grapefruits and other products. The import of products originating from Israeli settlements into the EU under the Association Agreement is not only a violation of the agreement, but also contributes to a breach of international humanitarian law. As was mentioned above, the settlements constitute a breach of Article 47 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Under Article 1 of the Convention, the High Contracting Parties of the Convention have the duty to act when the Convention is breached. When importing products from the settlements, the EU and its member states are contributing to a breach of the convention and therefore breaching the convention themselves.

Jerusalem

Although Ehud Barak was the first Israeli leader willing to open the issue of Jerusalem for discussion, a solution to the final status of the city has not come any closer. Jerusalem is one of the most sensitive final status issues and was labelled as the issue that led to the failure of the Camp David meeting. During his period as Prime Minister, Ehud Barak promised to hand over three villages around Jerusalem to the PNA. The Knesset approved the transfer, but it was never carried out. Meanwhile, Israel continued to create more facts on the ground in and around the city that complicate a solution to the final status of Jerusalem. (See the section on settlements above.) In addition to increasing the Jewish population of East Jerusalem, the Israeli authorities aim to decrease the percentage of Palestinians in East Jerusalem, the so-called ‘Judaisation’ of East Jerusalem. Today, about 180,000 Israelis live in the settlements in East Jerusalem. Israel aims at preserving the demographic balance of 66% Jews and 33% Arabs in the city. In order to achieve that, the Israeli authorities put restrictions on construction of Palestinian houses in the city in the hope that Palestinians will move elsewhere. For a Palestinian it is almost impossible to obtain a building permit from the Jerusalem municipality. Because of the high birth rate, many Palestinians live in overcrowded conditions and decide to build houses or additions to existing houses without a permit, taking the risk of having their house demolished. During the past year, the Israeli authorities demolished nine houses in Jerusalem because they were built without a permit.[56]

Another instrument that the Israeli authorities have been using to decrease the Palestinian population of Jerusalem is the confiscation of ID cards. Many Palestinians lost their residency rights in the city as a result of the ‘centre of life’ policy, which was silently implemented by the Israeli Ministry of Interior in 1995. Palestinians who could not prove sufficiently that their ‘centre of life’ was Jerusalem saw their residency rights in the city revoked. The Jerusalem ID is highly important for Palestinians, because Palestinians without a Jerusalem ID need a special permit from the Israeli authorities to enter the city. Moreover, the Jerusalem ID gives Palestinians access to Israeli health and other insurances provided by the National Insurance Institute (NII). In the rest of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, insurance systems are far less developed. As a result of the above-mentioned ‘centre of life’ policy, 2,721 residency cards have been revoked between January 1996 and April 1999. According to Badil, this affected about four times that number of people, since many people have their children registered on their ID. After a successful lobby of Israeli and Palestinian human rights organisations, the then Minister of the Interior, Nathan Sharansky, announced that the ‘centre of life’ policy would be ended and that persons whose ID cards had been confiscated unjustly would get back their residency rights in Jerusalem. Since then there have not been any reports of  ID confiscations on the basis of the ‘centre of life’ policy.[57]   

A worrying fact in the conflict over Jerusalem is that political leaders have brought the religious aspect of Jerusalem into the discussion. Ironically it was secular politicians such as Ehud Barak who did so and who emphasised the religious value of Jerusalem for all Jews. Religious leaders such as the Latin Patriarch, H.B. Michel Sabbah, emphasise that the conflict is a political conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, not a conflict between religions.

Water

The issue of water remains one on the unsolved final status issues. Israel controls all the water sources in the occupied territories since 1967. In the Oslo II  Agreement of 1995, Israel recognised the Palestinian water rights in the West Bank, but postponed a final agreement to the final status negotiations. According to the Agreement, a Joint Water Committee was established for the interim period, in which the Palestinians and Israel share the management of the water sources, but Israel may veto new water projects. Per capita water consumption in the West Bank for Domestic, urban and industrial use is approximately 70 liters a day. In Israel, the per capita consumption of water for domestic, urban and industrial use is about 350 liters a day.[58] The World Health Organisation and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) recommend 100 liters of water per person per day as the minimum quantity for basic consumption.  The Oslo II Agreement estimates the future water needs of the Palestinians in the West Bank to be 70-80 million m² per year, and makes available to the Palestinians an additional 28.6 million m² per year  during the interim period. Under the Interim Agreement, the arrangements in the Gaza Strip remain unchanged. Overall, the transfers of the Interim Agreement leave Israel with 90% of the shared water sources.[59] Israel and the Palestinians share two water sources: the Mountain Aquifer and the Jordan River Basin. Currently, Israel receives 79% of the Mountain Aquifer water and even 100% of the Jordan River Basin water. When negotiating over the final solution for the water issue, it should be kept in mind that the Interim Agreement is contradictory to international law in the following respects:

a. The distribution from shared water sources is inequitable; according to international law, both parties should allocate shared water sources on an equitable basis;

b. Under the current Interim Agreement water consumption by settlements is protected, while it is a violation of international humanitarian law;

c. The Palestinians do not enjoy their rights to the Jordan River Basin, although it is a shared water source.[60]

In a final status agreement, Israel and the PNA should have equal authority over shared water resources.

RECOMMENDATIONS

·        The EU must reconsider its political role in the Middle East. The EU is one of the main donors to the Palestinians. Although donor money is necessary, this economical role should be accompanied by a political role. Europe’s role should change from “payer” into “player”. Now that American President George W. Bush has stated that he will not continue Clinton’s strategy in mediating in the negotiations between Israel and the PLO, a gap has been left and the EU has been given a chance and obligation to take its responsibility in the region. The EU can facilitate negotiations between the two parties, but should also ensure that the negotiations will not be dominated by the imbalance in power between Israel and the Palestinians.

·        The EU and its member states must commit itself to alleviate the economic pressure on the Palestinian civilian population. In that light, Israel must be pressured to lift the economic siege of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and be urged to stop with activities like the uprooting of (olive) trees. The EU must also see to it that Israel transfers tax income to the PNA. The EU and its member states can alleviate the economic crisis by encouraging foreign investment in the Palestinian territories, especially in small and medium scale private enterprises. The unsteady investment climate should be compensated by other preferences and credit facilities. In addition, temporary emergency aid from the EU is necessary in order to prevent growing distress that can evoke more violence.

·        The EU and its member states must ensure that no products produced in territories occupied by Israel are imported into the EU as Israeli products under EU preferences. Under Article 83 of the Association Agreement between Israel and the EU, products from the occupied territories are excluded from the agreement. Moreover, the Israeli settlements in the occupied territories constitute a breach of article 47 of the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilians in Time of War. By importing products from these settlements, the EU and its member states are contributing to breaches of international humanitarian law. Therefore, import of these products must be stopped immediately.

·        Representatives of Israeli and Palestinian organisations point out the important role of the EU, but complain about the bureaucracy of the Union. EU procedures to approve projects and allocate funds are too slow. The EU should improve its contribution by speeding up its procedures.

·        The EU must monitor the creation of ‘facts on the ground’, for instance in the field of the creation of new settlements and the expansion of existing ones as well as with regard to the further ‘judaisation’ of Jerusalem, and take necessary measures against Israel’s breach of Article 47 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Ariel Sharon has lately expressed intentions to opt for new interim agreements with the Palestinians, instead of a final agreement. Therefore, more ‘facts on the ground’ that will complicate future negotiations must be prevented.

·        The EU and its member states can contribute to the development of a viable Palestinian state. In order to be able to change the Palestinian economy from a dependent into an interdependent economy, the Palestinians must have control over their natural resources, including water, their external borders (including the airport and seaport in Gaza), their infrastructure, their tax system, and there must be free passage between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Europe has important expertise in economic co-operation, which is the basis of the EU. Europe should apply this expertise in the creation on the long term of a region of healthy, interdependent economies.

·        Europe must continue its efforts in building up respect for human rights in the region. The EU should take systematic action against cases of arbitrary arrests and extra-judicial executions, of structural violations of the freedom of expression, of excessive use of force against innocent civilians, and of gross denials of economic, social and cultural rights by both Israel and the PNA. However, the EU should be careful in making improvements in these fields conditional upon financial and other forms of assistance to the PNA. The Palestinian Authority is in such a difficult position, that missing the support by another major donor would be very detrimental, at least in the short run.

·        Within the UN framework, the EU should lobby for the establishment of a special committee in order to monitor to protection of Palestinian civilians against indiscriminate force and human rights violations. This body could have the form of human rights observers, or a UN force with a broader mandate.

·        A special point of concern, also for the EU, should be the position of the refugees. The international community, and the EU as part of it, can positively influence the number of refugees who choose to return to Israel by providing generous funds for compensation and by offering the refugees the possibility to obtain citizenship in other countries.

·        An independent international investigation committee must be established on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 1322 of 7 October 2000, that will investigate violations of international humanitarian law by the Israeli security forces in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.